Microeconomics › Section J · Monopolistic competition and oligopoly › Topic J.4
Repeated and sequential games
One-shot dilemmas reward treachery; but most real rivals meet again, and most real moves happen in order. Repetition lets yesterday's behaviour be punished tomorrow, and sequence lets earlier moves shape later ones - two features that decide whether cooperation survives and whether threats are believed.
In this topic
- The shadow of the future
- Tit-for-tat
- Triggers and the value of the future
- Worked example: the arithmetic of staying honest
- Unravelling: the known last round
- Sequential games and game trees
- Worked example: deterring entry with a threat
- Commitment: binding your own hands
- Who moves first?
- Common mistakes to avoid
- Key takeaways
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